Pollen germination observations free essay sample

There was a correlation observed between the concentration of lead the pollen was exposed to and the extent of growth inhibition observed. The effect of 20 pimp, pimp, pimp and 80 pimp lead on pollen tube germination were studied using light microscopy. A progressive decrease in the percentage of pollen germination indicated that higher levels of toxicity caused higher growth inhibitions. Introduction: Heavy metals are natural components of the Earths crust. They cannot be degraded or destroyed.To a small extent they enter our bodies via food, drinking water and air. As trace elements, some heavy metals are essential to maintain the metabolism of the human body. However, at higher incinerations they can lead to poisoning for human, animal, plant and microorganisms. Over the last decades, environmental contamination with heavy metals has increased drastically (Hussar Koran, Emmet Shin 2005) Heavy metals have recently received the attention of researchers all over the world, mainly due to their harmful effects on plant. We will write a custom essay sample on Pollen germination observations or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page The toxic effects of metals have also been intensively studied at the level of biochemical- physiological process such as photosynthesis, transpiration, enzyme activity or metal accumulation in tissue. Pollen germination and tube growth are used to detect biological activity of various environmental pollutants such as pesticides, heavy metals, acid rain etc. In this experiment we report the effect of different concentrations of lead, and its effect on pollen germination as seen in the pollen grains of the Hibiscus flower.Materials: Chemicals : -Penne powder obtained from Lobo chemicals. -Solutions of different concentrations of Lead and 80 pimp). Dilutions prepared using distilled water. -0. 1 N HCI obtained from Mere, Chronicles, Iambi. (Negative control) -Sucrose obtained from Lobo Chemicals, Iambi. (Positive control) Glass ware: Glass slides, Moisture hammers, Petri dishes, Pipettes, Droppers. (All obtained from Borzois) Filter paper, Scalpel/Abide, Microscope (Meter Pit Ltd v), Hibiscus flowers. Method : Pollen grains were obtained from the Hibiscus flower by placing the anthers on a glass slide and lightly dusting the pollen grains using a scalpel or a blade. The effect of each concentration was studied in triplicates, so as to minimize error. A negative control using dill. HCI and a positive control using sucrose solution were prepared for each set. Thus a total of 24 glass slides were prepared. Alongside, the filter paper was placed in a moisture chamber and et with a few drops of water so as to keep the conditions moist and favorable for pollen germination.The lead solution Was diluted to obtain individual solutions of concentrations pimp (mm BP + mi DID), pimp (ml BP + D/W), pimp (ml BP + D/W) and pimp (ml BP +D/W). 0. 1 ml of 20 pimp lead solution was mounted on to 3 slides with pollen grains. 3 such slides were prepared for each dilution of lead solution prepared. 3 controls were prepared for each set, using dill. HCI, distilled water and sucrose as negative and positive controls respectively. Each of these slides were placed n the moisture chamber and allowed to stand for 20 minutes.

Marilyn Manson Essays (3439 words) - Manson Family, Marilyn Manson

Marilyn Manson Marilyn Manson is a name that has been a thorn in the side of society as a moral and ethical issue for the parents and kids of the generation "X". He is one of the most controversial artists in the world today, one who chooses to express himself in a way that provokes in the most extreme methods possible. His methods are bizarre and shunned by most of society, as it cannot fathom what he is trying to accomplish. However, further research into his life and beliefs will explain that he is sending a very strong message to the world. A message that is firmly protect by the First Amendment in the American Constitution. This freedom has unleashed a number of technical issues, as well as indirect damage done by the people who would interpret his message incorrectly. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association (assembly). It also protects the rights of citizens to worship as they please and the right not to be forced to support someone else's religion. The First Amendment also provides for the right to assemble and to demand a change in government policies. (Bill of Rights, Encarta 1999 CDROM). Manson uses this freedom fully, getting his message across by any means possible, mainly to the younger generation. These younger generations are more accepting of his attitude and beliefs, partly due to the fact that teens are more susceptible to mass persuasion and are easily confused. This has helped Manson conjure up a large loyal following of disgruntled teens that are called "Mansonites." How Manson gets his message across has been the center of controversy revolving around the US ever since Manson's rise to stardom. His moral, ethical and religious actions have been questioned repeatedly. His ethics may be a representation of how disorientated American society has become in the late 1990s. Alternatively, Manson may simply be showing that the media can be used to manipulate the American mind more easily than their own values at heart. "God is in the TV" (Rock is Dead) Manson screams. Now, how did this man become what he is today? Where did he form his views about life and society, which would ultimately lead to his notorious antics and cause millions of American parents and city council members to want to cancel his concerts, against the First Amendment? ("Politicians Rally against Manson"). Marilyn Manson is the band name and the stage name of lead singer Brian Warner, who formed the band in 1989 and whose apparent business savvy and flair for controversy turned into a success. Using androgyny, satanic images and themes of rebellion and death, Manson irked bystanders and proved that outrageous rock was still a viable form of entertainment. ("Manson: Rock Star") The name Marilyn Manson comes from a pseudonym of Marilyn Monroe and Charles Manson, two opposites of society. (Manson, 85) Ever since Marilyn Manson's release of his album Anti-Christ Superstar, many people have associated and accused him of influencing teen suicide and Satanism, just because he acted, dressed and performed as an individual brought up by society's mistakes. ("Marilyn Manson") It is this kind of media and political attention that Manson has received to become such a big name in controversy in the last decade. It all depends in how one takes his remarks and viewpoints. If no attention were paid to Manson's antics, there would be no controversy; therefore, his entire essence of being the AntiChrist may have been created by society itself. "On moral responsibility: Kids see more from their parents than they would anyone else. They're the ones who should set the example." ("Manson on Manson") This is Manson's criticism of all the parents who would criticize him. Parents are the biggest complainers about Manson, partly because they are of the older generation and partly because they can use Manson as a scapegoat for problems with teenage crime and suicide in the US. "We talked about the kids inside, the tragedy of hopelessness, the blatant rebellion against God and Manson's part in the whole thing." (Benson, It's only Rock N Roll..NOT). This is where the conflicts within the First Amendment come into play. Too many people disagree on everything, however everyone is entitled to their own opinion, of course there are more against Manson than for him which is where extreme actions are taken that are either ridicules or unconstitutional. When college students are fined $250 plus court costs for simply wearing a Manson T-shirt, there are definitely problems. ("Manson Shirt Wearer Fined").

Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essays

Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essays Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essay Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essay JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=jphil. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [emailprotected] org. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. s collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. jstor. org WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 183 WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL T n HE view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, seriouslyim- moral has received little support in the recent philosophical literature. No doubt most philosophers affiliated with secular institutions of higher education believe that the anti-abortion position is either a symptom of irrational religious dogma or a conclusion generated by seriously confused philosophical argument. The purpose of this essay is to undermine this general belief. This essay sets out an argument that purports to show, as well as any argument in ethics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being. The argument is based on a major assumption. Many of the most insightful and careful writers on the ethics of abortion-such as Joel Feinberg, Michael Tooley, Mary Anne Warren, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. , L. W. Sumner, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Philip Devinebelieve that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will assume, but not argue, that they are correct. Also, this essay will neglect issues of great importance to a complete ethics of abortion. Some anti-abortionists will allow that certain abortions, such as abortion before implantation or abortion when the life of a woman is threatened by a pregnancy or abortion after rape, may be morally permissible. This essay will not explore the casuistry of these hard cases. The purpose of this essay is to develop a general argument for the claim that the overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral. I. A sketch of standard anti-abortion and pro-choice arguments exhibits how those arguments possess certain symmetries that explain why partisans of those positions are so convinced of the correctness of their own positions, why they are not successful in convincing Feinberg, Abortion, in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Tom Regan, ed. New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 256-293; Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, Philosophy and Public Affairs, ii, 1 (1972):37-65, Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford, 1984); Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, The Monist, I. vii, 1 (1973):4361; Engelhardt, The Ontology of Abortion, Ethics, lxxxiv, 3 (1974):217-234; Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton: University Pre ss, 1981); Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, Noonan, ed. Cambridge: Harvard, 1970); and Devine, The Ethics of Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell, 1978). 0022-362X /89/8604/183-22 (? 1989 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 184 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY their opponents, and why, to others, this issue seems to be unresolvable. An analysis of the nature of this standoff suggests a strategy for surmounting it. Consider the way a typical anti-abortionist argues. She will argue or assert that life is present from the moment of conception or that fetuses look like babies or that fetuses possess a characteristic such as a genetic code that is both necessary and sufficient for being human. Anti-abortionists seem to believe that (1) the truth of all of these claims is quite obvious, and (2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to show that abortion is morally akin to murder. A standard pro-choice strategy exhibits similarities. The prochoicer will argue or assert that fetuses are not persons or that fetuses are not rational agents or that fetuses are not social beings. Pro-choicers seem to believe that (1) the truth of any of these claims is quite obvious, and (2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to show that an abortion is not a wrongful killing. In fact, both the pro-choice and the anti-abortion claims do seem to be true, although the it looks like a baby claim is more difficult to establish the earlier the pregnancy. We seem to have a standoff. How can it be resolved? As everyone who has taken a bit of logic knows, if any of these arguments concerning abortion is a good argument, it requires not only some claim characterizing fetuses, but also some general moral principle that ties a characteristic of fetuses to having or not having the right to life or to some other moral characteristic that will generate the obligation or the lack of obligation not to end the life of a fetus. Accordingly, the arguments of the anti-abortionist and the pro-choicer need a bit of filling in to be regarded as adequate. Note what each partisan will say. The anti-abortionist will claim that her position is supported by such generally accepted moral principles as It is always prima facie seriously wrong to take a human life or It is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the life of a baby. Since these are generally accepted moral principles, her position is certainly not obviously wrong. The pro-choicer will claim that her position is supported by such plausible moral principles as Being a person is what gives an individual intrinsic moral worth or It is only seriously prima facie wrong to take the life of a member of the human community. Since these are generally accepted moral principles, the pro-choice position is certainly not obviously wrong. Unfortunately, we have again arrived at a standoff. Now, how might one deal with this standoff? The standard approach is to try to show how the moral principles of ones opponent lose their plausibility under analysis. It is easy to see how this is WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAI, 185 possible. On the one hand, the anti-abortionist will defend a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing which tends to be broad in scope in order that even fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy will fall under it. The problem with broad principles is that they often embrace too much. In this particular instance, the principle It is always prima facie wrong to take a human life seems to entail that it is wrong to end the existence of a living human cancercell culture, on the grounds that the culture is both living and human. Therefore, it seems that the anti-abortionists favored principle is too broad. On the other hand, the pro-choicer wants to find a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing which tends to be narrow in scope in order that fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with narrow principles is that they often do not embrace enough. Hence, the needed principles such as It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill only persons or It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents do not explain why it is wrong to kill infants or young children or the severely retarded or even perhaps the severely mentally ill. Therefore, we seem again to have a standoff. The anti-abortionist charges, not unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too broad to be acceptable. Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficulties in their positions run into further difficulties. The anti-abortionist will try to remove the problem in her position by reformulating her principle concerning killing in terms of human beings. Now we end up with: It is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the life of a human being. This principle has the advantage of avoiding the problem of the human cancer-cell culture counterexample. But this advantage is purchased at a high price. For although it is clear that a fetus is both human and alive, it is not at all clear that a fetus is a human being. There is at least something to be said for the view that something becomes a human bei ng only after a process of development, and that therefore first trimester fetuses and perhaps all fetuses are not yet human beings. Hence, the anti-abortionist, by this move, has merely exchanged one problem for another. The pro-choicer fares no better. She may attempt to find reasons why killing infants, young children, and the severely retarded is 2 For interesting discussions of this issue, see Warren Quinn, Abortion: Identity and Loss, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiii, 1 (1984):24-54; and Lawrence C. Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, Philosophy and Public Affairs, iv, 4 (1975):334-359. 186 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY wrong which are independent of her major principle that is supposed to explain the wrongness of taking human life, but which will not also make abortion immoral. This is no easy task. Appeals to social utility will seem satisfactory only to those who resolve not to think of the enormous difficulties with a utilitarian account of the wrongness of killing and the significant social costs of preserving the lives of the unproductive. 3 A pro-choice strategy that extends the definition of person to infants or even to young children seems just as arbitrary as an anti-abortion strategy that extends the definition of human being to fetuses. Again, we find symmetries in the two positions and we arrive at a standoff. There are even further problems that reflect symmetries in the two positions. In addition to counterexample problems, or the arbitrary application problems that can be exchanged for them, the standard anti-abortionist principle It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill a human being, or one of its variants, can be objected to on the grounds of ambiguity. If human being is taken to be a biological category, then the anti-abortionist is left with the problem of explaining why a merely biological category should make a moral difference. Why, it is asked, is it any more reasonable to base a moral conclusion on the number of chromosomes in ones cells than on the color of ones skin? 4If human being, on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is a human being cannot be taken to be a premise in the anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely what needs to be established. Hence, either the antiabortionists main category is a morally irrelevant, merely biological category, or it is of no use to the anti-abortionist in establishing (noncircularly, of course) that abortion is wrong. Although this problem with the anti-abortionist position is often noticed, it is less often noticed that the pro-choice position suffers from an analogous problem. The principle Only persons have the right to life also suffers from an ambiguity. The term person is typically defined in terms of psychological characteristics, although there will certainly be disagreement concerning which characteristics are most important. Supposing that this matter can be settled, the pro-choicer is left with the problem of explaining why psychological characteristics should make a moral difference. If the pro-choicer should attempt to deal with this problem by claiming that an explanaFor example, see my Ethics and The Elderly: Some Problems, in Stuart Spicker, Kathleen Woodward, and David Van Tassel, eds. , Aging and the Elderly: Humanistic Perspectives in Gerontology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1978), pp. 341-355. 4See Warren, op. cit. , and Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 187 tion is not necessary, that in fact we do treat such a cluster of psychological properties as having moral significance, the sharp-witted anti-abortionist should have a ready response. We do treat being both living and human as having moral significance. If it is legitimate for the pro-choicer to demand that the anti-abortionist provide an explanation of the connection between the biological character of being a human being and the wrongness of being killed (even though people accept this connection), then it is legitimate for the antiabortionist to demand that the pro-choicer provide an explanation of the connection between psychological criteria for being a person and the wrongness of being killed (even though that connection is accepted). Feinberg has attempted to meet this objection (he calls psychological personhood commonsense personhood): that The characteristics confer commonsensepersonhoodare not arbitrarybases for rights and duties, such as race, sex or species membership;ratherthey are traitsthat makesense out of rightsand duties and wouldhaveno point or function. It withoutwhichthose moralattributes is becausepeople are conscious;havea sense of theirper sonalidentities; haveplans,goals, and projects;experienceemotions;are liableto pains, anxieties, and frustrations;can reason and bargain, and so on-it is becauseof these ttributesthat people havevaluesand interests,desires and expectationsof their own, includinga stake in their own futures, and a personalwell-beingof a sort we cannot ascribeto unconsciousor nonrationalbeings. Because of their developed capacitiesthey can assume duties and responsibilities can have and makeclaimson one and another. Only becauseof their sense of self, their life plans, their value hierarchies,and their stakesin their own futures can they be ascribed fundamentalrights. There is nothing arbitraryabout these linkages (op. cit. , p. 270). The plausible aspects of this attempt should not be taken to obscure its implausible features. There is a great deal to be said for the view that being a psychological person under some description is a necessary condition for having duties. One cannot have a duty unless one is capable of behaving morally, and a beings capability of behaving morally will require having a certain psychology. It is far from obvious, however, that having rights entails consciousness or rationality, as Feinberg suggests. We speak of the rights of the severely retarded or the severely mentally ill, yet some of these persons are not rational. We speak of the rights of the temporarily unconscious. The New Jersey Supreme Court based their decision in the Quinlan case This seems to be the fatal flaw in Warrens treatment of this issue. 188 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY on Karen Ann Quinlans right to privacy, and she was known to be permanently unconscious at that time. Hence, Feinbergs claim that having rights entails being conscious is, on its face, obviously false. Of course, it might not make sense to attribute rights to a being that would never in its natural history have certain psychological traits. This modest connection between psychological personhood and moral personhood will create a place for Karen Ann Quinlan and the temporarily unconscious. But then it makes a place for fetuses also. Hence, it does not serve Feinbergs pro-choice purposes. Accordingly, it seems that the pro-choicer will have as much difficulty bridging the gap between psychological personhood and personhood in the moral sense as the anti-abortionist has bridging the gap between being a biological human being and being a human being in the moral sense. Furthermore, the pro-choicer cannot any more escape her problem by making person a purely moral category than the anti-abortionist could escape by the analogous move. For if person is a moral category, then the pro-choicer is left without the resources for establishing (noncircularly, of course) the claim that a fetus is not a person, which is an essential premise in her argument. Again, we have both a symmetry and a standoff between pro-choice and antiabortion views. Passions in the abortion debate run high. There are both plausibilities and difficulties with the standard positions. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that partisans of either side embrace with fervor the moral generalizations that support the conclusions they preanalytically favor, and reject with disdain the moral generalizations of their opponents as being subject to inescapable difficulties. It is easy to believe that the counterexamples to ones own moral principles are merely temporary difficulties that will dissolve in the wake of further philosophical research, and that the counterexamples to the principles of ones opponents are as straightforward as the contradiction between A and 0 propositions in traditional logic. This might suggest to an impartial observer (if there are any) that the abortion issue is unresolvable. There is a way out of this apparent dialectical quandary. The moral generalizations of both sides are not quite correct. The generalizations hold for the most part, for the usual cases. This suggests that they are all accidental generalizations, that the moral claims made by those on both sides of the dispute do not touch on the essence of the matter. This use of the distinction between essence and accident is not meant to invoke obscure metaphysical categories. Rather, it is in- WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 189 tended to reflect the rather atheoretical nature of the abortion discussion. If the generalization a partisan in the abortion dispute adopts were derived from the reason why ending the life of a human being is wrong, then there could not be exceptions to that generalization unless some special case obtains in which there are even more powerful countervailing reasons. Such generalizations would not be merely accidental generalizations; they would point to, or be based upon, the essence of the wrongness of killing, what it is that makes killing wrong. All this suggests that a necessary condition of resolving the abortion controversy is a more theoretical account of the wrongness of killing. After all, if we merely believe, but do not understand, why killing adult human beings such as ourselves is wrong, how could we conceivably show that abortion is either immoral or permissible? II. In order to develop such an account, we can start from the following unproblematic assumption concerning our own case: it is wrong to kill us. Why is it wrong? Some answers can be easily eliminated. It might be said that what makes killing us wrong is that a killing brutalizes the one who kills. But the brutalization consists of being inured to the performance of an act that is hideously immoral; hence, the brutalization does not explain the immorality. It might be said that what makes killing us wrong is the great loss others would experience due to our absence. Although such hubris is understandable, such an explanation does not account for the wrongness of killing hermits, or those whose lives are relatively independent and whose friends find it easy to make new friends. A more obvious answer is better. What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victims friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of ones life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of ones life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted ones future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim. To describe this as the loss of life can be misleading, however. The change in my biological state does not by itself make killing me wrong. The effect of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future personal life. These activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments are either valuable for their own sakes or are means to something else that is valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my future are not valued by me now, but will come to be valued by 190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY me as I grow older and as my values and capacities change. When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong. This being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future. 6 How should this rudimentary theory of the wrongness of killing be evaluated? It cannot be faulted for deriving an ought from an is, for it does not. The analysis assumes that killing me (or you, reader) is prima facie seriously wrong. The point of the analysis is to establish which natural property ultimately explains the wrongness of the killing, given that it is wrong. A natural property will ultimately explain the wrongness of killing, only if (1) the explanation fits with our intuitions about the matter and (2) there is no other natural property that provides the basis for a better explanation of the wrongness of killing. This analysis rests on the intuition that what makes killing a particular human or animal wrong is what it does to that particular human or animal. What makes killing wrong is some natural effect or other of the killing. Some would deny this. For instance, a divinecommand theorist in ethics would deny it. Surely this denial is, however, one of those features of divine-command theory which renders it so implausible. The claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victims future is,directly supported by two considerations. In the first place, this theory explains why we regard killing as one of the worst of crimes. Killing is especially wrong, because it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. In the second place, people with AIDS or cancer who know they are dying believe, of course, that dying is a very bad thing for them. They believe that the loss of a future to them that they would otherwise have experienced is what makes their premature death a very bad thing for them. A better theory of the wrongness of killing would require a different natural property associated with killing which better fits with the attitudes of the dying. What could it be? The view that what makes killing wrong is the loss to the victim of the value of the victims future gains additional support when some of its implications are examined. In the first place, it is incompatible h I have been most influenced on this matter byJonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (New York: Penguin, 1977), ch. 3; and Robert Young, What Is So Wrong with Killing People? Philosophy, l iv, 210 (1979):515-528. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 191 with the view that it is wrong to kill only beings who are biologically human. It is possible that there exists a different species from another planet whose members have a future like ours. Since having a future like that is what makes killing someone wrong, this theory entails that it would be wrong to kill members of such a species. Hence, this theory is opposed to the claim that only life that is biologically human has great moral worth, a claim which many antiabortionists have seemed to adopt. This opposition, which this theory has in common with personhood theories, seems to be a merit of the theory. In the second place, the claim that the loss of ones future is the wrong-making feature of ones being killed entails the possibility that the futures of some actual nonhuman mammals on our own planet are sufficiently like ours that it is seriously wrong to kill them also. Whether some animals do have the same right to life as human beings depends on adding to the account of the wrongness of killing some additional account ofjust what it is about my future or the futures of other adult human beings which makes it wrong to kill us. No such additional account will be offered in this essay. Undoubtedly, the provision of such an account would be a very difficult matter. Undoubtedly, any such account would be quite controversial. Hence, it surely should not reflect badly on this sketch of an elementary theory of the wrongness of killing that it is indeterminate with respect to some very difficult issues regarding animal rights. In the third place, the claim that the loss of ones future is the wrong-making feature of ones being killed does not entail, as sanctity of human life theories do, that active euthanasia is wrong. Persons who are severely and incurably ill, who face a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die will not have suffered a loss if they are killed. It is, strictly speaking, the value of a humans future which makes killing wrong in this theory. This being so, killing does not necessarily wrong some persons who are sick and dying. Of course, there may be other reasons for a prohibition of active euthanasia, but that is another matter. Sanctity-of-human-life theories seem to hold that active euthanasia is seriously wrong even in an individual case where there seems to be good reason for it independently of public policy considerations. This consequence is most implausible, and it is a plus for the claim that the loss of a future of value is what makes killing wrong that it does not share this consequence. In the fourth place, the account of the wrongness of killing defended in this essay does straightforwardly entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill children and infants, for we do presume that they have futures of value. Since we do believe that it is wrong to kill 192 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY defenseless little babies, it is important that a theory of the wrongness of killing easily account for this. Personhood theories of the wrongness of killing, on the other hand, cannot straightforwardly account for the wrongness of killing infants and young children. 7 Hence, such theories must add special ad hoc accounts of the wrongness of killing the young. The plausibility of such ad hoc theories seems to be a function of how desperately one wants such theories to work. The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future accounts for the wrongness of killing young children and infants directly; it makes the wrongness of such acts as obvious as we actually think it is. This is a further merit of this theory. Accordingly, it seems that this value of a future-like-ours theory of the wrongness of killing shares strengths of both sanctity-of-life and personhood accounts while avoiding weaknesses of both. In addition, it meshes with a central intuition concerning what makes killing wrong. The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong. This argument does not rely on the invalid inference that, since it is wrong to kill persons, it is wrong to kill potential persons also. The category that is morally central to this analysis is the category of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the category of personhood. The argument to the conclusion that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong proceeded independently of the notion of person or potential person or any equivalent. Someone may wish to start with this analysis in terms of the value of a human future, conclude that abortion is, except perhaps in rare circumstances, seriously morally wrong, infer that fetuses have the right to life, and then call fetuses persons as a result of their having the right to life. Clearly, in this case, the category of person is being used to state the conclusion of the analysis rather than to generate the argument of the analysis. The structure of this anti-abortion argument can be both illuminated and defended by comparing it to what appears to be the best 7 Feinberg, Tooley, Warren, and Engelhardt have all dealt with this problem. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL. 193 argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals. This latter argument is based on the assumption that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on me (or you, reader). What is the natural property associated with the infliction of pain which makes such infliction wrong? The obvious answer seems to be that the infliction of pain causes suffering and that suffering is a misfortune. The suffering caused by the infliction of pain is what makes the wanton infliction of pain on me wrong. The wanton infliction of pain on other adult humans causes suffering. The wanton infliction of pain on animals causes suffering. Since causing suffering is what makes the wanton infliction of pain wrong and since the wanton infliction of pain on animals causes suffering, it follows that the wanton infliction of pain on animals is wrong. This argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals shares a number of structural features with the argument for the serious prima facie wrongness of abortion. Both arguments start with an obvious assumption concerning what it is wrong to do to me (or you, reader). Both then look for the characteristic or the consequence of the wrong action which makes the action wrong. Both recognize that the wrong-making feature of these immoral actions is a property of actions sometimes directed at individuals other than postnatal human beings. If the structure of the argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals is sound, then the structure of the argument for the prima facie serious wrongness of abortion is also sound, for the structure of the two arguments is the same. The structure common to both is the key to the explanation of how the wrongness of abortion can be demonstrated without recourse to the category of person. In neither argument is that category crucial. This defense of an argument for the wrongness of abortion in terms of a structurally similar argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals succeeds only if the account regarding animals is the correct account. Is it? In the first place, it seems plausible. In the second place, its major competition is Kants account. Kant believed that we do not have direct duties to animals at all, because they are not persons. Hence, Kant had to explain and justify the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals on the grounds that he who is hard in his dealings with animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men. 8 The problem with Kants account is that 8 Duties to Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infeld, trans. (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 239. 194 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY there seems to be no reason for accepting this latter claim unless Kants account is rejected. If the alternative to Kants account is accepted, then it is easy to understand why someone w ho is indifferent to inflicting pain on animals is also indifferent to inflicting pain on humans, for one is indifferent to what makes inflicting pain wrong in both cases. But, if Kants account is accepted, there is no intelligible reason why one who is hard in his dealings with animals (or crabgrass or stones) should also be hard in his dealings with men. After all, men are persons: animals are no more persons than crabgrass or stones. Persons are Kants crucial moral category. Why, in short, should a Kantian accept the basic claim in Kants argument? Hence, Kants argument for the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals rests on a claim that, in a world of Kantian moral agents, is demonstrably false. Therefore, the alternative analysis, being more plausible anyway, should be accepted. Since this alternative analysis has the same structure as the anti-abortion argument being defended here, we have further support for the argument for the immorality of abortion being defended in this essay. Of course, this value of a future-like-ours argument, if sound, shows only that abortion is prima facie wrong, not that it is wrong in any and all circumstances. Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus, if killed, is, however, at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard adult human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons. The loss of ones life is almost the greatest misfortune that can happen to one. Presumably abortion could be justified in some circumstances, only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great. Accordingly, morally permissible abortions will be rare indeed unless, perhaps, they occur so early in pregnancy that a fetus is not yet definitely an individual. Hence, this argument should be taken as showing that abortion is presumptively very seriously wrong, where the presumption is very strong-as strong as the presumption that killing another adult human being is wrong. III. How complete an account of the wrongness of killing does the value of a future-like-ours account have to be in order that the wrongness of abortion is a consequence? This account does not have to be an account of the necessary conditions for the wrongness of killing. Some persons in nursing homes may lack valuable human futures, yet it may be wrong to kill them for other reasons. Furthermore, this account does not obviously have to be the sole reason killing is wrong where the victim did have a valuable future. This analysis claims only WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 195 that, for any killing where the victim did have a valuable future like ours, having that future by itself is sufficient to create the strong presumption that the killing is seriously wrong. One way to overturn the value of a future-like-ours argument would be to find some account of the wrongness of killing which is at least as intelligible and which has different implications for the ethics of abortion. Two rival accounts possess at least some degree of plausibility. One account is based on the obvious fact that eople value the experience of living and wish for that valuable experience to continue. Therefore, it might be said, what makes killing wrong is the discontinuation of that experience for the victim. Let us call this the discontinuation account. ~ Another rival account is based upon the obvious fact that people strongly desire to continue to live. This suggests that what makes killing us so wrong is that it interferes with the fulfillment of a str ong and fundamental desire, the fulfillment of which is necessary for the fulfillment of any other desires we might have. Let us call this the desire account. I'( Consider first the desire account as a rival account of the ethics of killing which would provide the basis for rejecting the anti-abortion position. Such an account will have to be stronger than the value of a future-like-ours account of the wrongness of abortion if it is to do the job expected of it. To entail the wrongness of abortion, the value of a future-like-ours account has only to provide a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the wrongness of killing. The desire account, on the other hand, must provide us also with a necessary condition for the wrongness of killing in order to generate a prochoice conclusion on abortion. The reason for this is that presumably the argument from the desire account moves from the claim that what makes killing wrong is interference with a very strong desire to the claim that abortion is not wrong because the fetus lacks a strong desire to live. Obviously, this inference fails if someones having the desire to live is not a necessary condition of its being wrong to kill that individual. One problem with the desire account is that we do regard it as seriously wrong to kill persons who have little desire to live or who have no desire to live or, indeed, have a desire not to live. We believe it is seriously wrong to kill the unconscious, the sleeping, those who 9 I am indebted to Jack Bricke for raising this objection. Presumably a preference utilitarian would press such an objection. Tooley once suggested that his account has such a theoretical underpinning. See his Abortion and Infanticide, pp. 44/5. re tired of life, and those who are suicidal. The value-of-a-humanfuture account renders standard morality intelligible in these cases; these cases appear to be incompatible with the desire account. The desire account is subject to a deeper difficulty. We desire life, because we value the goods of this life. The goodness of life is not secondary to our desire for it. If this were not so, the pain of ones own premature death could be done away with merely by an appropria te alteration in the configuration of ones desires. This is absurd. Hence, it would seem that it is the loss of the goods of ones future, not the interference with the fulfillment of a strong desire to live, which accounts ultimately for the wrongness of killing. It is worth noting that, if the desire account is modified so that it does not provide a necessary, but only a sufficient, condition for the wrongness of killing, the desire account is compatible with the value of a future-like-ours account. The combined accounts will yield an anti-abortion ethic. This suggests that one can retain what is intuitively plausible about the desire account without a challenge to the basic argument of this paper. It is also worth noting that, if future desires have moral force in a modified desire account of the wrongness of killing, one can find support for an anti-abortion ethic even in the absence of a value of a future-like-ours account. If one decides that a morally relevant property, the possession of which is sufficient to make it wrong to kill some individual, is the desire at some future time to live-one might decide to justify ones refusal to kill suicidal teenagers on these grounds, for example-then, since typical fetuses will have the desire in the future to live, it is wrong to kill typical fetuses. Accordingly, it does not seem that a desire account of the wrongness of killing can provide a justification of a pro-choice ethic of abortion which is nearly as adequate as the value of a human-future justification of an anti-abortion ethic. The discontinuation account looks more promising as an account of the wrongness of killing. It seems just as intelligible as the value of a future-like-ours account, but it does not justify an anti-abortion position. Obviously, if it is the continuation of ones activities, experiences, and projects, the loss of which makes killing wrong, then it is not wrong to kill fetuses for that reason, for fetuses do not have experiences, activities, and projects to be continued or discontinued. Accordingly, the discontinuation account does not have the antiabortion consequences that the value of a future-like-ours account has. Yet, it seems as intelligible as the value of a future-like-ours account, for when we think of what would be wrong with our being WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL, 197 illed, it does seem as if it is the discontinuation of what makes our lives worthwhile which makes killing us wrong. Is the discontinuation account just as good an account as the value of a future-like-ours account? The discontinuation account will not be adequate at all, if it does not refer to the value of the experience that may be discontinued. One does not want the discontinuation account to make it wrong to kill a patient who begs for death and who is in severe pain that cannot be relieved short of killing. (I leave open the question of whether it is wrong for other reasons. Accordingly, the discontinuation account must be more than a bare discontinuation account. It must make some reference to the positive value of the patients experiences. But, by the same token, the value of a future-like-ours account cannot be a bare future account either. Just having a future surely does not itself rule out killing the above patient. This account must make some reference to the value of the patients future experiences and projects also. Hence, both accounts involve the value of experiences, projects, and activities. So far we still have symmetry between the accounts. The symmetry fades, however, when we focus on the time period of the value of the experiences, etc. , which has moral consequences. Although both accounts leave open the possibility that the patient in our example may be killed, this possibility is left open only in virtue of the utterly bleak future for the patient. It makes no difference whether the patients immediate past contains intolerable pain, or consists in being in a coma (which we can imagine is a situation of indifference), or consists in a life of value. If the patients future is a future of value, we want our account to make it wrong to kill the patient. If the patients future is intolerable, whatever his or her immediate past, we want our account to allow killing the patient. Obviously, then, it is the value of that patients future which is doing the work in rendering the morality of killing the patient intelligible. This being the case, it seems clear that whether one has immediate past experiences or not does no work in the explanation of what makes killing wrong. The addition the discontinuation account makes to the value of a human future account is otiose. Its addition to the value-of-a-future account plays no role at all in rendering intelligible the wrongness of killing. Therefore, it can be discarded with the discontinuation account of which it is a part. IV. The analysis of the previous section suggests that alternative general accounts of the wrongness of killing are either inadequate or unsuccessful in getting around the anti-abortion consequences of the value 198 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY of a future-like-ours argument. A different strategy for avoiding these anti-abortion consequences involves limiting the scope of the value of a future argument. More precisely, the strategy involves arguing that fetuses lack a property that is essential for the value-ofa-future argument (or for any anti-abortion argument) to apply to them. One move of this sort is based upon the claim that a necessary condition of ones future being valuable is that one values it. Value implies a valuer. Given this one might argue that, since fetuses cannot value their futures, their futures are not valuable to them. Hence, it does not seriously wrong them deliberately to end their lives. This move fails, however, because of some ambiguities. Let us assume that something cannot be of value unless it is valued by someone. This does not entail that my life is of no value unless it is valued by me. I may think, in a period of despair, that my future is of no worth whatsoever, but I may be wrong because others rightly see value-even great value-in it. Furthermore, my future can be valuable to me even if I do not value it. This is the case when a young person attempts suicide, but is rescued and goes on to significant human achievements. Such young peoples futures are ultimately valuable to them, even though such futures do not seem to be valuable to them at the moment of attempted suicide. A fetuss future can be valuable to it in the same way. Accordingly, this attempt to limit the anti-abortion argument fails. Another similar attempt to reject the anti-abortion position is based on Tooleys claim that an entity cannot possess the right to life unless it has the capacity to desire its continued existence. It follows that, since fetuses lack the conceptual capacity to desire to continue to live, they lack the right to life. Accordingly, Tooley concludes that abortion cannot be seriously prima facie wrong (op. cit. , pp. 46/7). What could be the evidence for Tooleys basic claim? Tooley once argued that individuals have a prima facie right to what they desire and that the lack of the capacity to desire something undercuts the basis of ones right to it (op. cit. , pp. 44/5). This argument plainly will not succeed in the context of the analysis of this essay, however, since the point here is to establish the fetuss right to life on other grounds. Tooleys argument assumes that the right to life cannot be established in general on some basis other than the desire for life. This position was considered and rejected in the preceding section of this paper. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORA, 199 One might attempt to defend Tooleys basic claim on the grounds that, because a fetus cannot apprehend continued life as a benefit, its continued life cannot be a benefit or cannot be something it has a right to or cannot be something that is in its interest. This might be defended in terms of the general proposition that, if an individual is literally incapable of caring about or taking an interest in some X, then one does not have a right to X or X is not a benefit or X is not something that is in ones interest. Each member of this family of claims seems to be open to objections. As John C. Stevens2 has pointed out, one may have a right to be treated with a certain medical procedure (because of a health insurance policy one has purchased), even though one cannot conceive of the nature of the procedure. And, as Tooley himself has pointed out, persons who have been indoctrinated, or drugged, or rendered temporarily unconscious may be literally incapable of caring about or taking an interest in something that is in their interest or is something to which they have a right, or is something that benefits them. Hence, the Tooley claim that would restrict the scope of the value of a future-like-ours argument is undermined by counterexamples. 3 Finally, Paul Bassen4has argued that, even though the prospects of an embryo might seem to be a basis for the wrongness of abortion, an embryo cannot be a victim and therefore cannot be wronged. An embryo cannot be a victim, he says, because it lacks sentience. His central argument for this seems to be that, even though plants and the permanently unconscious are alive, they clearly cannot be victims. What is the explanation of this? Bassen claims that the explanation is that their lives consist of mere metabolism and mere metabolism is not enough to ground victimizability. Mentation is required. The problem with this attempt to establish the absence of victimizability is that both plants and the permanently unconscious clearly lack what Bassen calls prospects or what I have called a future life like ours. Hence, it is surely open to one to argue that the real reason we believe plants and the permanently unconscious cannot be Donald VanDeVeer seems to think this is self-evident. See his Whither Baby Doe? in Matters of Life and Death, p. 233. 12Must the Bearer of a Right Have the Concept of That to Which He Has a Right? Ethics, xcv, 1 (1984):68-74. `See Tooley again in Abor tion and Infanticide, pp. 47-49. Present Sakes and Future Prospects: The Status of Early Abortion, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xi, 4 (1982):322-326. 200 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY victims is that killing them cannot deprive them of a future life like ours; the real reason is not their absence of present meritation. Bassen recognizes that his view is subject to this difficulty, and he recognizes that the case of children seems to support this difficulty, for much of what we do for children is based on prospects. He argues, however, that, in the case of children and in other such cases, potentiality comes into play only where victimizability has been secured on other grounds (ibid. , p. 333). Bassens defense of his view is patently question-begging, since what is adequate to secure victimizability is exactly what is at issue. His examples do not support his own view against the thesis of this essay. Of course, embryos can be victims: when their lives are deliberately terminated, they are deprived of their futures of value, their prospects. This makes them victims, for it directly wrongs them. The seeming plausibility of Bassens view stems from the fact that paradigmatic cases of imagining someone as a victim involve empathy, and empathy requires mentation of the victim. The victims of flood, famine, rape, or child abuse are all persons with whom we can empathize. That empathy seems to be part of seeing them as victims. In spite of the strength of these examples, the attractive intuition that a situation in which there is victimization requires the possibility of empathy is subject to counterexamples. Consider a case that Bassen himself offers: Posthumous obliteration of an authors work constitutes a misfortune for him only if he had wished his work to endure (op cit. , p. 318). The conditions Bassen wishes to impose upon the possibility of being victimized here seem far too strong. Perhaps this author, due to his unrealistic standards of excellence and his low self-esteem, regarded his work as unworthy of survival, even though it possessed genuine literary merit. Destruction of such work would surely victimize its author. In such a case, empathy with the victim concerning the loss is clearly impossible. Of course, Bassen does not make the possibility of empathy a necessary condition of victimizability; he requires only mentation. Hence, on Bassens actual view, this author, as I have described him, can be a victim. The problem is that the basic intuition that renders Bassens view plausible is missing in the authors case. In order to attempt to avoid counterexamples, Bassen has made his thesis too weak to be supported by the intuitions that suggested it. I Note carefully the reasons he gives on the bottom of p. 316. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 201 Even so, the mentation requirement on victimizability is still subject to counterexamples. Suppose a severe accident renders me totally unconscious for a month, after which I recover. Surely killing me while I am unconscious victimizes me, even though I am incapable of mentation during that time. It follows that Bassens thesis fails. Apparently, attempts to restrict the value of a future-like-ours argument so that fetuses do not fall within its scope do not succeed. V. In this essay, it has been argued that the correct ethic of the wrongness of killing can be extended to fetal life and used to show that there is a strong presumption that any abortion is morally impermissible. If the ethic of killing adopted here entails, however, that contraception is also seriously immoral, then there would appear to be a difficulty with the analysis of this essay. But this analysis does not entail that contraception is wrong. Of course, contraception prevents the actualization of a possible future of value. Hence, it follows from the claim that futures of value should be maximized that contraception is prima facie immoral. This obligation to maximize does not exist, however; furthermore, nothing in the ethics of killing in this paper entails that it does. The ethics of killing in this essay would entail that contraception is wrong only if something were denied a human future of value by contraception. Nothing at all is denied such a future by contraception, however. Candidates for a subject of harm by contraception fall into four categories: (1) some sperm or other, (2) some ovum or other, (3) a sperm and an ovum separately, and (4) a sperm and an ovum together. Assigning the harm to some sperm is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making a sperm the subject of harm rather than an ovum. Assigning the harm to some ovum is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making an ovum the subject of harm rather than a sperm. One might attempt to avoid these problems by insisting that contraception deprives both the sperm and the ovum separately of a valuable future like ours. On this alternative, too many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed to be wrong, because it deprived us of one future of value, not two. One might attempt to avoid this problem by holding that contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable future like ours. But here the definite article misleads. At the time of contraception, there are hundreds of millions of sperm, one (released) ovum and millions of possible combinations of all of these. There is no actual combination at all. Is the subject of the loss to be a merely possible 202 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY combination? Which one? This alternative does not yield an actual subject of harm either. Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception. VI. The purpose of this essay has been to set out an argument for the serious presumptive wrongness of abortion subject to the assumption that the moral permissibility of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus. Since a fetus possesses a property, the possession of which in adult human beings is sufficient to make killing an adult human being wrong, abortion is wrong. This way of dealing with the problem of abortion seems superior to other approaches to the ethics of abortion, because it rests on an ethics of killing which is close to self-evident, because the crucial morally relevant property clearly applies to fetuses, and because the argument avoids the usual equivocations on human life, human being, or person. The argument rests neither on religious claims nor on Papal dogma. It is not subject to the objection of speciesism. Its soundness is compatible with the moral permissibility of euthanasia and contraception. It deals with our intuitions concerning young children. Finally, this analysis can be viewed as resolving a standard probthe standard problem-concerning the ethics of lem-indeed, abortion. Clearly, it is wrong to kill adult human beings. Clearly, it is not wrong to end the life of some arbitrarily chosen single human cell. Fetuses seem to be like arbitrarily chosen human cells in some respects and like adult humans in other respects. The problem of the ethics of abortion is the problem of determining the fetal property that settles this moral controversy. The thesis of this essay is that the problem of the ethics of abortion, so understood, is solvable. DON MARQUIS University of Kansas

rent control essays

rent control essays In theory rent control sounds like a perfect way to help the poor by setting the price ceilings on the rent, but in reality it only will hurt them. In the real world rent controls do not work like most people would expect them to, maybe its because not many people had their lesson in economics. Controls on rent will lead to less efficient allocation of scarce resources, and people at the top of the economic ladder will not be hurt. Only those at the bottom of the economic ladder will be hurt because even with price ceilings bottom ladder of the society is still not participating in the market. Instead of trying to transfer wealth from landlords to tenants, people at the lower ladder should be helped by allowing them to participate in the market just like the rest of economic society. The effects of the rent control will be shortages; higher prices and landlords would eventually allow their buildings to deteriorate, this is the time where government should let the "invisible hand " do its job and let the supply and demand determine the price of rent. Rent control has been enforced in many major American cities for many decades. The best know examples of rent control are in New York, which still has rent control from the temporary wartime price controls imposed during World War II. During 1970's it looked like price ceilings on rent would be the wave of the future. Boston implemented rent control during the inflation years of 1969 through 1971. Many cities that adopted rent controls eventually made them permanent even after they have expired. Even though rent controls were becoming very popular some cities still remained immune to this temptation. Chicago has one of the largest populations of renters in America, but they have never seriously considered adopting this system. At this time there are about 31 American states that have created laws and constitutional amendments forbidding rent control. Once in place, rent co...

Evaluation on Mathematics Term Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Evaluation on Mathematics - Term Paper Example Since the 1960s, the mathematic abilities of American Students has been deteriorating compared to those students from other nations. A recent study illustrated that mathematic performance depends more on education and attitude rather than inborn genetic talent (Kimball & Smith, 2013). As such, this particular analysis will focus on the ways in which mathematics is an essential component of the current society and how it is essential that students be effectively trained in math and taught not to simply â€Å"give up† if the first attempt (or attempts) were less than satisfactory. Math is objective, so students who do poorly on exams will tend to compare themselves to those who did well; not realizing that those students were well prepared. The dilemma occurs as the under-performing students identify themselves with the phrase, "Im just not good at math". From this point, it may seem the student will use this as a excuse that could decrease their motivation to prepare for math exams. This self-fulfilling prophecy can cause people to avoid approaching math with "perseverance, tenacity, and fearlessness," which is the attitude needed for people to succeed (Schwartz, 2006). Yet, as has been noted previously, the reality of this approach is that it creates generations of students that simply give up on math; rather than coming to appreciate the fact that it is a difficult subject that requires a certain degree of dedication and mastery to successfully understand and apply. In order to encourage the increased levels of dedication that should be reflected within st udents, educators would do well to remind them how fundamental math is and some of the reasons why is will come to be of ever increasing importance if these students would like to attain a well paying job after graduation (Goel & Reid, 2012). One of the first and

Strategic Planning for Digital Marketing Communications Essay

Strategic Planning for Digital Marketing Communications - Essay Example SV has expanded footings catering section for airlines (Saudi Airlines a, 2012). SV has partnered with Sky team Alliance; a group of 18 international Airlines to provide more flexibility, convenience and choices to customer of member alliances (Saudi Airlines b, 2012). SECTION 1: CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIVES Section 1a: â€Å"General† marketing communications challenges ISSUES CHALLENGES 1 Global business is moving around the slogan of â€Å"Be Global – Act Local† (Amey, 2012). Globalization &Localization on increasing destination as well as service. 2 Tightening of policies, increasing taxes resulting in job losses; counts up to 1.6 mn in UK in 2010 the trend continues till date (The Economic Times, 2012), US waiting for sustained pick up in consumption, Top ten areas of change in consumer spending worldwide are aimed to be financially considerate (Delotte, 2011). Adopting product marketing that persistently stands business product to be best value for money spent. 3 Spending moved from bricks to clicks and now on to mobile. 52% of US consumers using mobile for purchases overall with more than 20% of air-tickets are purchased through mobile. Availability and adaptability with most digital mediums. 4 51 % rely on online shopping for product search and evaluation. In 2012, 167 million people shopped online with average amount of $1800. Sufficient information with easy purchase option to attract customer base. Accelerated pace of globalization with media in general and social media in specific Performance is open is for anyone and everyone for evaluation; more importantly beyond managements control. Priority challenges and risks: Globalization expansion in China (Amey, 2012). Increased accessibility: increased communication through interactive mobile. Huge risks are associated as increasing pace of digital has not been adopted with similar pace. Currently flight passengers’ account in 58% of Saudis, 22% of Arab and while70% is guest trave lers. Consistent travelers are less (for instance, seasonal travelers in holy months). Travelers’ consideration of SV as best value for money can be ranked medium as it ranks n 6th among the top 10 economy class (Sky Trax, 2012) but mainly accounts for the guest. Focusing mainly on guests and not growing business class is risk. Digital connectivity for flight bookings only (Clear Trip, 2012). Industry challenges ISSUES CHALLENGES 1 Post 9/11Security issues. Redeveloping travelers trust along with strong force than 9/11 updates on various mediums. 2 Fuel prices and economic uncertainty increasing continuously shrinking profits. IATA project Airline profit $ 3.0 Bn. Maintaining effective flights schedule and promptly passing on updated information to customer at easiest disposal 3 Deregulation/privatization of airlines; advertising fare regulation (Zacks Equity Research, 2012) Retaining customer along with detailing price component of tax in advertisement 4 Blocks or strategic alliances to maintain Selection of marketing tactic to exploit benefits of alliances and possible issues. Priority challenges & risk 1. SV developed alliance with Sky team gained the benefits cost saving, flexibility etc but not marketed other than press releases updates on member websites (Sky Team, 2012). 2. For increasing efficiency its flight program Al- Fursan has been developed. This program has been provided with internet based marketing as present on the airline’

IT Department BTEC Essay Example for Free

IT Department BTEC Essay Describe the various types of threats to organisations, systems and data P1 * Unauthorised access This category covers internal and external threats. Internal threats are things such as: Magic Disks A recovery or backup disk that has been modded to include viruses or key loggers. Man in the middle attacks People extracting sensitive and confidential information whilst posing to be a customer, or a legitimate company. Implanting Key loggers Applications designed to record key strokes and send them back to the hacker. External threats are this such as; Viruses Rouge applications designed to damage or make a system vunerable Trojans Applications designed to infiltrate a system often by posing to be a harmless file or embedded into another file. Piggybacking A term given to people who use someone elses internet connection without authorisation. This is often undertaken by logging onto an unsecured network without permission. Phishing Attempting to fool a user into believing you are a legitimate service attempting to gain sensitive information. Â  Damage to or destruction of systems or information. Damage to systems can occur when devices fail such as hard drives failing or natural disasters occurring in the workplace that could result in damaged or destroyed places. Such as: 1. Natural Disasters: This refers to what happens when data is lost as a result of natural disasters such as earth-quakes, floods, tsunamis, terrorists, fires and such. 2. Malicious Damage: This covers data that is lost, damaged, or stolen as a result of a hacker of some sort. A hacker can implant a virus onto a system in order to damage the system or simply steal data such as credit card data. 3. Technical Failure: Technical Failure covers when devices fail abruptly such a servers going down, power supply failing, hard-drives crashing ect. 4. Human Errors: is when someone makes a mistake which results in data being lost. Incidents such as people accidentally deleting files and pulling plugs and such. 5. Theft: Theft occurs when criminals gain access to an office building or other work environment and physically steal hardware and other entities that have a significant impact on the company (such as data). Â  Information security Information security refers to keeping sensitive data safe and confidential. An organisation would need to keep data complete, precise and up-to-date. Data such as bank details, blood types, addresses and other such information needs to be kept secure and confidential. Â  Threats related to e-commerce There are various security threats related to E-commerce. As websites that sell goods online rely solely on the availability and accessibility of an online store, they need to ensure the website is secure and not vulnerable to hackers. For example; Denial of Service attacks could prevent potential customers from purchasing goods and thus forth lose sales. Another example is website defacement which would also repel potential customers from buying online. There is also a threat of hackers implementing the man in the middle technique on behalf of particular online retailers which fools customers in believing the hacker is a legitimate worker of the website, this method could result in the hacker exploiting the customer and thus gaining the website a bad reputation. Â  Counterfeit goods Counterfeit goods effect creators, directors and artists as they cause a direct loss to potential income. Downloading counterfeit software, movies and music could result In a fine or lawsuit. Counterfeit goods are becoming increasingly popular as the ease of ripping DVDs, Music and Software makes it easier to access. Counterfeit goods may cause loss of business for companies. The loss of business then results in businesses having to raise prices to make up for loss of profit. Â  Organisational impact Security threats can cause loss or alteration of essential documents that the an organisation may need to function correctly. Loss of business followed by loss of income can also occur, this ultimately could result in bad reputation from potential customers. Systems going down could result in companies being unable to contact suppliers and customers. Circumstances of 4 security related threats on organisations p2 Phishing -This is the process of gaining information from someone by pretending to be a legitimate worker for a company and retrieving information for legitimate reasons. Phishing could result in customer details being leaked, distributed, and exploited. This could badly reflect on the company and lose the company business and income. Denial of Service Denial of Service is a process that involves a hacker overloading a server which results in the server being forced to shut down. This could result in loss of potential customers and thus profit. Piggybacking Piggybacking is the process of using a company internet connection without having authorisation to use it. This can severely effect bandwidth and damage company productivity. Piggybacking could result in systems lagging and becoming slow, this would result in workers being unable to do there job efficiently and at an optimised pace. There is also a threat posed by people using a companies network to browse illegal content to which the company would have to take responsibility. Man in the middle attack This is the process of being directly involved in communicating with both parties, claming to be one another. The outcome is both parties believe they are speaking to eachother, but they are actually talking to someone else. This method results in the man in the middle acquiring sensitive information such as credit card details from either party. This could result in the middle man leaking sensitive customer information such as customer addresses and more importantly; bank details. This could then result in the company getting a bad reputation or being taken to court for breaching data protection. The man in the middle could also waste company time and as a result; money. Countermeasures Implemented to reduce risk of damage to systems p3 p4 Countermeasures Vermason could implement to protect physical systems p3: CCTV This would work as both a visual deterrent to prevent thieves and vandals breaking into a building and causing damage or stealing systems and would also enable the company to keep an eye on potentially rouge employees that may steal data or embed viruses into systems. Sheilding Network Cables and Wirless Communications Data travelling via electro-magnetic or radio transmissions can be vulnerable to being remotely monitored because the copper data cable can be analysed to discover what data is travelling along the line. Fibre optic is the safest variation of network cabling and cables can be shielded to prevent data being tapped into. This would be a great countermeasure to prevent sensitive data from being leaked or exploited. Intrusion Detection Systems Systems such as proximity alarms can prevent burglars breaking into a building and can be set-up to call the police upon break-in. This works as both a deterrent; because warning potential burglars of alarms would prevent them from breaking in. And also as a countermeasure to attempt to catch anyone with malicious intent. Countermeasures Vermason could implement to protect network security p4: Backups Backups are an essential countermeasure in offices. If there was an electrical fire or other natural disaster that could result in loss of data, this would insure that all essential data such as databases the company requires to undertake work related tasks are still there aswell as contact, supplier and customer information so that they do not need to be re-acquired. Passwords Passworded systems can be implemented to secure individual workers within the company, it firstly provides an element of data security for each individual (eg; sensitive information that may be kept on a user account) and also holds each user responsible for there own actions on the computer under there own user account. More importantly; passwords ensure that only legitimate employees have access to important company files and other such potentially confidential information. Firewalls A firewall would prevent unauthorised access from outside the network. It does this by scanning data packets coming onto the computer and ensuring that they are safe, it also is responsible for actively preventing viruss such as Trojans being downloaded from the internet and onto the network computers. Installing a firewall would prevent hackers from accessing the network and stealing data or causing damage.